Last Time | Next Time |
Your exam will cover the material since the previous exam:
6 boys prefer | 4 boys prefer | 8 girls prefer | 4 girls prefer | |
First Choice | Chad | Chad | Gwyn | Courtney |
Second Choice | Courtney | Gwyn | Courtney | Gwyn |
Third Choice | Gwyn | Courtney | Chad | Chad |
Three voting schemes, three different winners.
Look, it seems like this should be easy. We want a system that has the following properties, given each voter's list of ordered rankings for the candidates:
Here's the main, astonishing result:
That is, one person makes the decision.
It was not a "fluke" that different methods gave different results. As mentioned in the text, mathematicians can "rig" a seemingly benign system that will hand the election over to a preferred candidate.
Example:
5 voters' ranking | 5 voters' ranking | 5 voters' ranking | |
First Place | A | B | C |
Second Place | B | C | A |
Third Place | C | A | B |
Look at the beautiful symmetry in this table.... It's responsible for the problem, in many ways.